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registration, that he could not recall the name of the vessel's owner and that the vessel 
had an expired Idaho registration sticker to be sufficient to constitute reasonable 
suspicion. Other less persuasive factors included the defendant's story about the boat 
being on a test run, despite the tools being in new condition and the defendant's unsoiled 
appearance; that the inspector knew that the vessel was on a course typically used by 
smugglers and that the inspector knew that duffel bags of the type seen on the vessel were 
typically used in smuggling operations. 
Finally, the court considered whether or not the delay exceeded the permissible 
limits of an investigative detention. The court concluded that the investigation was 
minimally intrusive and that the investigation was conducted quickly and efficiently. 
Given the mobility of the ship, the proximity to the international border, the court found 
the additional 15-20 minute delay caused by the background check to be incidental when 
weighed against the United States' interest in "the prevention, detection and suppression 
of violations of laws in the United States". For Fourth Amendment purposes, the court 
found that "[the] detention was minimally intrusive until reasonable suspicion ripened 
into probable cause for the search and arrest of the smugglers." 
The defendant does not dispute that the Coast Guard had sufficient probable cause 
to search the vessel after the results of the background check were made known to the 
Coast Guard. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court order granting the 
defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for a new trial. 
George Schneider 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY ACT AND THE PRIMARY DUTY RULE 
The owner of a vessel is absolutely liable for injuries arising from the vessel's 
unseaworthiness; the Limitation of Liability Act is an exception to absolute liability, 
and the owner of the vessel will be relieved of liability if the three prongs of the 
primary duty rule are satisfied. 
(Decided Aug. 7, 2002) 
Northern Queen, Inc. v. Kathryn Kinnear 
298 F.3d 1090 (9111 Cir. 2002) 
Northern Queen, Inc. ("Northern Queen") was a small, family-owned corporation 
which had two principal shareholders: Blake Kiru1ear ("Kinnear"), the president, 
managing, agent, and captain who owned 22 percent of the corporation shares, and 
Kinnear's mother, Linda Kinnear, the corporation's secretary/treasurer who owned 77 
percent. Kinnear's minor daughter owned one percent of the shares. Northern Queen's 
primary asset was the fishing ship LIN J ("the vessel"). 
In March of 1999, the vessel participated in the crab season in the northwest 
section of the Bering Sea. On March 9, 1999, Kinnear sent e-mails to his mother and wife 
indicating that the weather was turning bad and ice was becoming a concern. On March 
15, 1999 crabbing was interrupted due to worsening weather. The vessel spent the next 
two days gathering pots. By March 17 the vessel had gathered 62 crab pots, which 
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contained about 55,000 pounds of crab. On the evening ofMarch 17, 1999 Kinnear sent 
an email to the cannery notifying them that he expected to be back in 30-36 hours due to 
icing and slow going. In his next email, 12 hours later, Kinnear again stated that icing 
was still causing problems, but this time there was mention of an intermittent bilge alarm 
from the lazarette. He also stated that they were not able to pump water out. Kinnear 
planned to make a stop at St. Paul, six hours away. However, six hours after Kinnear's 
last email, the vessel sent out a distress call indicating that it was capsizing. Shortly 
thereafter it sank, killing everyone aboard. 
After its vessel sank, Northern Queen brought an action seeking to limit its 
liability to Kinnear's estate ("Estate") for the accident, pursuant to the Limitation of 
Liability Act, 46 USC § § 181 et. seq. ("Limitation Act"). The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington entered judgment in favor of Northern Queen 
limiting its liability under the primary duty rule. Although the district court determined 
that Northern Queen was not entitled to exoneration or limitation under the Limitation 
Act, due to the vessel's unseaworthiness at the time of the accident, under the affirmative 
defense of the primary duty rule, because Kinnear, as the vessel's captain had knowledge 
of the vessel's unseaworthiness and failed to correct it, Northern Queen was not liable to 
his estate. Kiru1ear's estate appealed. 
On appeal there were two issues presented to the court: first, whether the district 
court erred in finding that Kinnear had failed to take adequate measures to prevent or 
correct the accumulation of water in the lazarette, and second, whether the district court 
erred in concluding that Northern Queen had satisfied all the elements of the primary 
duty rule. 
In addressing the first issue the Court of Appeals was asked to review the district 
court's findings of fact. The standard of review applied by the court in such cases is 
highly deferential. In this instance the court relied on Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 
1076 (9111 Cir. 2002), wherein the court stated it would accept a lower court's finding of 
fact unless there are "definite and firn1 convictions that a mistake has been committed." 
During the trial the parties had stipulated that the vessel capsized due to excessive ice 
build-up and the water in the lazarette, and to the fact that the vessel's average speed was 
five to six knots. Although the estate conceded as to the duties of the vessel captain, it 
argued that there was not enough evidence presented to support the district court's 
findings. The estate argued that although the vessel did carry 62 pots of crabs, there was 
no evidence that this compromised the vessel's safety. The estate also argued that with 
regard to the lazarette, Kinnear had recognized that there was a problem, and that there 
was no evidence provided that he did not try to correct it. The estate also offered a 
witness, Greene Cowan ("Cowan"), who testified to typical industry practice to carry no 
more than 25 pots in such conditions, and therefore with 62 pots on board access to the 
lazarette would be impossible. Based on Cowan's testimony, which the district court 
determined to be credible, the lower court found that the capsizing of the vessel was 
attributable to decisions made by Kinnear. The district court found that it was likely that 
the vessel was traveling too fast to allow for the removal of ice build-up, and that the 
presence of 62 crab pots prevented remedying of the situation in the lazarette. The Court 
of Appeals found that the estate presented no evidence that indicated that the district 
court was mistaken in its conclusion, and found no error. 
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The second issue addressed by the court was whether Northern Queen had 
satisfied all the elements of the primary duty nlle. The Court of Appeals cited California 
Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Reinhart v. 
United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972)) noting that under the primary duty rule, "a 
seaman-employee may not recover from his employer for injuries caused by his own 
failure to perf01m a duty imposed on him by his employment." 
The Court of Appeals discussed three factors that must be satisfied in order for an 
employer to relieve itself from liability under the primary duty rule. The first factor is that 
the seaman must have consciously assumed a duty as a term of his employment. The 
estate argued that despite the fact that Kinnear was the captain of the vessel and that his 
duty was to operate the vessel safely, his duty was general in nature, rendering the 
primary duty rule inapplicable. The court disagreed. The court noted that the duty of a 
captain is highly specific. It is the captain who was ultimately making all pertinent 
decisions, based on his experience and amount of skill. It was his duty to provide for the 
safety of the crewmembers and the well being of the vessel, and to respond to any outside 
factors accordingly. The court concluded that on the day of March 17, 1999, Kinnear did 
not respond appropriately to the worsening weather conditions and the alarm in the 
lazarette, which led to the loss of the vessel with all hands on board. The court found that 
Northern Queen had satisfied the first element. 
The second factor addressed by the court was whether the dangerous condition 
that injured the seaman had either been created by the seaman or could have been 
controlled or eliminated solely by the seaman in the proper exercise of his employment 
duties. The estate argues that Ki1mear alone could not have corrected or eliminated the 
dangerous condition that faced the vessel on March 17. The court again disagreed. The 
court stated that decisions such as the speed and course of the boat, and the number of 
crab pots that could be stored on board are in the realm of the captain's authority and his 
alone. The court concluded that the decisions made by Kinnear were the factors that 
caused the vessel to capsize and subsequently sink. The court stated that Kinnear's 
decision to proceed at the speed of five to six knots with 62 crab pots under such weather 
conditions more likely than not caused the icing. The number of pots on board also 
prevented access to the lazarette and made it impossible to fix the problem there. The 
court stated that it was in Kinnear's power alone to address the icing problem and the 
lack of access to the lazarette, as he could have chosen to go slower and to dump some of 
the crab pots. 
The third factor the court examined was the issue of whether the seaman 
knowingly violated a duty consciously assumed as a condition of the employment. The 
Court of Appeals cited Bernard v. Maersk Lines, Ltd. , 22 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 1994) in 
stating that the primary duty rule does not apply to a momentary lapse of care by an 
otherwise careful seaman. Instead, there must be conscious disregard for the seaman's 
duties. The estate argued that Kinnear's actions could be seen as constituting an innocent 
miscalculation and not conscious disregard. The court disagreed once again. The court 
stated that the emails that Kinnear sent made it clear that he was aware of the icing 
conditions and bilge alarms in the lazarette. The court found that Kinnear's actions 
actually contributed to the build up of ice and inaccessibility of the lazarette, and that 
these actions were inconsistent with the typical behavior of captains under such 
conditions. Thus, the court concluded that Kinnear had violated his duties as captain. 
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According, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's findings that Kinnear 
failed to take adequate measures to prevent or correct the accumulation of water in the 
lazarette and that Northern Queen had satisfied all the elements of the primary duty rule. 
The dissenting opinion in this case agreed with the majority on most issues except 
for its treatment of the third prong of the primary duty rule. The dissent felt that the 
record supported the finding that Kim1ear had been negligent, not that he had knowingly 
violated his duty, and did not agree with the finding that Northern Queen had satisfied the 
primary duty rule. 
Mariya Link 
AN INJURY SUFFERED ON SHORE MUST BE CAUSED BY A DEFECTIVE APPURTENANCE 
OF A Sl-llP ON NAVIGABLE WATERS UNDER THE ADMIRAL TV EXTENSION ACT 
Summary judgment was properly granted for the defendants against the plaintiff 
who suffered a back injury while unloading groceries and supplies for an oil 
platform from the back of an improperly loaded box. 
Dahlen v. Gulf Crews, Inc. 
281 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(Decided February 4, 2002, cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 261 (2002)) 
Plaintiff Peter Dahlen ("Dahlen"), an employee of Island Operating assigned to 
work as a barge operator for the Forest Oil Corporation's ("Forest") platforms in the Gulf 
of Mexico was told on July 6, 1995 to pick up a grocery order. The order had been 
placed with Universal Ogden Services ("Universal") by Forest on July 5th for 3 
platforms, West Cameron 44, High Island 116, and High Island 820. The groceries had 
been loaded into an eight-foot square metal cube called a "grocery box". They were 
transported by truck from Universal to a dock in Sabine Pass, Louisiana, then loaded onto 
the MIV Billy Jay, which was owned by Gulf Crews, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services, Inc. 
(collectively, "Gulf') had been time chartered by Forest to be taken to its offshore 
platforms. Dahlen was told to go to West Cameron 44 to perfonn routine maintenance 
and unload the groceries. When he opened the box, he found that the supplies for West 
Cameron 44 had been loaded in the back of the grocery box. Because the box only had 
one door, Dahlen had to take everything out to get the West Cameron 44 groceries out 
and then replace the supplies for the other platforms. Dahlen claimed that this caused 
him to suffer a back injury, for which he had to return to shore the following day. 
Eventually he had to undergo lumbar fusion surgery to stabilize his back. 
Dahlen filed suit for negligence on May 2, 1996 in Louisiana state court, naming 
Gulf, Universal, and Forest as defendants. The defendants removed the action on May 
28, 1996 to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"). Gulf and Universal were granted motions for 
summary judgment based on the grounds that they owed no legal duty to Dahlen. Forest 
was granted summary judgment based on the claim of platform liability, but was denied 
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